Introduction
When making a decision one prospectively considers potential actions and their anticipated consequences [1, 2] . This allows behavior to readily adapt when circumstances change, but is cognitively taxing. The brain has another, more resource efficient, strategy for routine behaviors: habits. Habits permit common behaviors to be executed more automatically on the basis of their past success, without thought of their consequences, freeing attention to be focused elsewhere [3, 4] . The balance between the reflective, goal-directed, and reflexive, habit, systems promotes maximally adaptive and efficient behavior [5, 6] , but when it is disrupted can lead to the symptoms that underlie myriad psychiatric and neurodegenerative diseases [7 ,8-11] . Indeed, deficits in the acquisition and execution of behavioral habits are symptoms of both Huntington's [12] and Parkinson's disease [13] [14] [15] . An overreliance on habit is associated with the various forms of compulsivity that manifest across a range of conditions [8, 16] Research over the past two decades has exposed the largely dissociable cortico-striatal-limbic brain circuits vital for goal-directed actions and habits (for review see: [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] ). New information is emerging on how habits are acquired and stored within these networks. This is the focus of this review.
Diagnosing and understanding habits
Instrumental behaviors can be modeled by training subjects to perform an action (e.g. lever press, maze run, button push) to receive a reward (e.g. food). Behavioral strategy cannot, however, be determined from simple observation of performance. Outcome-specific devaluation provides one diagnostic tool. Following training, non-reinforced instrumental performance is assessed after devaluation of the earned reward, usually achieved by sensory-specific satiation or pairing with a nauseainducing agent. If subjects are prospectively evaluating the outcome of their actions, they will reduce action performance following devaluation [1, 5] . Insensitivity to devaluation is a mark of habits [4, 5] . Habits are also resistant to degradation of the action-outcome contingency [30] . Initially, instrumental behavior is under control of the cognitively-taxing, but less error-prone, goal-directed system [1, 5] . With repeated practice (e.g. overtraining), habits will slowly form and will come to dominate behavioral control when enough successful repetition has proceeded to ensure sufficient accuracy of the habit [3] [4] [5] . For the purpose of this review, habits will be defined as behaviors that are demonstrably insensitive to outcome devaluation and/or action-outcome contingency manipulation. In some cases, we will refer to data on motor-skill, procedural, or action-sequence learning, which have been argued to share many features with behavioral habits.
Habits have long been proposed to rely on a stimulusresponse (S-R) associative architecture [5, [31] [32] [33] [34] . In this view, a reinforcing event functions to stamp in an association between the behavioral response that preceded it and the stimuli present when the response was executed, such that those stimuli become capable of automatically triggering the response. S-R associations are, however, inferred from a lack of evidence for action-outcome control. Although certainly a possibility, habits need not require S-R learning. Another, not necessarily mutually-exclusive, view is that habits result from the 'chunking' of commonly-performed action sequences into automatic, stereotyped routines [3, 35, 36] . One extension of this proposes that, rather than deliberating at each individual step, sequences of movements are
